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Abstract
In social sciences, there is currently no consensus on the mechanism for cul-
tural evolution. The evolution of first names of newborn babies offers a re-
markable example for the researches in the field. Here we perform statistical
analyses on over 100 years of data in the United States. We focus in particular
on how the frequency-rank distribution and inequality of baby names change
over time. We propose a stochastic model where name choice is determined
by personalized preference and social influence. Remarkably, variations on
the strength of personalized preference can account satisfactorily for the ob-
served empirical features. Therefore, we claim that personalization drives
cultural evolution, at least in the example of baby names.
Key words: Personalization, Social influence, Inequality, Simpson’s index,
Frequency-rank distribution
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1. Introduction
Cultural evolution is a dynamical process that cultural traits change over
time due to species’ fitness to social and natural environment. On one hand,
and thus it can be quantitatively described by the distribution of cultural
traits.
Remarkably, at all times evolutionary process exhibits the similar statis-
tical character that a relatively small number of traits are very popular, how-
ever, the majority barely gets any attention at all. In the past few decades,
a wide range of studies have been carried out in an attempt to uncover the
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mechanism generating such inequality. One explanation is given by Rosen
and MacDonald [1, 2]. They suggest that the inequality is caused by the
differential quality of cultural traits and can be reproduced by convexity of
the mapping from quality to popularity. An alternative explanation is pro-
vided by Adler [3]. He argues that individuals’ decisions are influenced by
the behavior of others, which leads to the inequality.
In order to test the empirical validity of the theories, Hamlen examined
the relationship between voice quality and record sales in the popular music
industry [4]. Empirical results show that the estimated elasticity of record
sales to voice quality is less than one, which repudiates the explanation of
Rosen and MacDonald. Afterward, Chung and others studied the role of so-
cial influence in success with the data from the Gold-Record Awards [5]. They
used the number of gold-records as the measure of success and found that
the stochastic model incorporating social influence can explain the observed
inequality in the empirical data excellently. Recently, Salganik and others
investigated social influence in cultural markets by a well-designed web-based
experiment in which participants may download previously unknown songs
either with or without knowledge of previous participants’ choices [6]. Com-
parative experiment shows that both the convex mapping from quality to
popularity and social influence play the vital role in the emergence of in-
equality.
Besides inequality among cultural traits, how the inequality evolves is
also a significant topic in researches on cultural evolution. However, so far
we almost know nothing about it, partly because of lack of suitable data.
Luckily, the evolution of first names of newborn babies offers a remarkable
example for the researches. In the paper, we perform statistical analyses
on over 100 years of data in the United States to investigate the following:
(1) The frequency-rank distribution and its evolution; (2) The evolution of
inequality; and (3) The property of temporal autocorrelation. Guided by
the empirical results, we propose a stochastic model where name choice is
determined by personalized preference and social influence. We show that
the simple model can reproduce the observed empirical features very well.
2. Data Analysis
The data on first names are taken from US Social Security Administra-
tion, and contain the top 1000 boys’ and girls’ names every year from 1880
to 2010. All names are from Social Security card applications for births that
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Figure 1: The frequency-rank distribution of baby girl names. (a) shows the distribution
in 1940, where the first and second power law decays have exponents 0.781 ± 0.010 and
1.772± 0.002, respectively. (b) shows the distributions in 1880, 1940, 1970 and 2010. By
comparison, one can find that both exponents in two regimes decrease over time. Baby
boy names have similar statistical features.
occurred in the United States after 1879. All data are from a 100% sample
of the records on Social Security card applications as of the end of February
2011.
Firstly, we study the distribution of baby names and its evolution. As
shown in Fig.1 (a), the frequency-rank distribution of baby names follows
the two-regime power law where the first power law decay has a smaller
exponent than the second one. The law was also found in the studies on
the frequency of words [7]. Then we compare the distributions in different
years and find that both the exponents in two regimes decline over time.
Fig.1 (b) graphically illustrates the evolution of the distribution, taking four
distributions for instance.
Secondly, we focus on the evolution of inequality. We use Simpson’s index
to measure the inequality among baby names. Simpson’s index is defined as
the probability of any two individuals drawn at random from newborn babies
in a year choosing the same first name, and is expressed as follows [8],
I =
n∑
i=1
p2i , (1)
where pi denotes the frequency of baby name i, and n is the number of first
names in a year. It ranges from 1/n (complete equality) to one (maximum
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Figure 2: The evolution of inequality. Inequality, in the main, declines over time.
inequality). Simpson’s index is heavily weighted towards names with large
frequency, while being less sensitive to the lack of names with small frequency.
Our data omit the names outside the top 1000, and thus Simpson’s index
is the most suitable measure of the inequality for our studies. We calculate
Simpson’s index for each year, and the results are shown in Fig.2. Inequality,
in the main, declines over time.
Thirdly, we study the property of temporal autocorrelation of the data.
Consider any two years t and t +△t. The same baby names are picked up
from the data in the two years, and their used times in the two years are
expressed as two vectors yt and yt+△t, respectively. Correlation is defined as
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between yt and yt+△t, which is computed by
the covariance of the two vectors divided by the product of their standard
deviations. The formula is expressed as follows,
C(t,△t) =
E[(yt − µt)(yt+△t − µt+△t)]
σtσt+△t
(2)
The empirical results are shown in Fig.3. For any given value of △t, the
correlation C(t,△t) drops with time t.
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Figure 3: The correlation functions of the data on baby names. The linear fits to the data
show that the correlation C(t,△t) drops with time t. In the figure, we only take the three
specific values of △t for instance.
3. The Stochastic Model of Cultural Evolution
To gain a deeper insight into cultural evolution, we propose a stochastic
model with the assumption on the individual’s decision making to reproduce
all the observed empirical features. In the artificial society, there are N
names to choose from. Time is discrete. At each time step, B new individuals
are born and choose names according to their evaluations for these names.
Obviously, the individual’s evaluation is based on personalized preference.
The more an individual likes a name, the more likely he chooses it. Besides
personalized preference, the individual’s evaluation is also socially influenced,
which can be seen from the fact that any one tends to choose the name that
he likes and that others also think well of. Based on this, we give a formulas,
by which individual i’s evaluation for name j at time t can be computed, as
follows,
pijt = ω
Qijt
N∑
k=1
Qikt
+ (1− ω)
t−1∑
l=t−m
ajl
N∑
k=1
t−1∑
l=t−m
akl
, (3)
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where Qijt denotes individual i’s preference to name j at time t, and akl is
the used times of name k at time l. In reality, the effect of the used times
on the individual’s evaluation is far from being uniform in time [9, 10, 11].
Thus, in Eq.(3), only the used times in recent m time steps are considered. In
terms of our model,
∑N
k=1
∑t−1
l=t−m
akl is equal to mB. ω is the weight which
ranges from 0 to 1. When ω is high, the evaluation process is considered to
be more personalized. Similar equations were used in the studies on other
issues [12]. Here, for simplicity, we assume that all the names are identical
to all the individuals at any time step. Thus, Eq.(3) changes to the following
form
pijt = ω
1
N
+ (1− ω)
t−1∑
l=t−m
ajl
mB
. (4)
Individuals choose names with the probability proportional to their evalua-
tions for names computed by Eq.(4). From this equation, we can also infer
that temporal autocorrelation we define decreases with the increase in ω.
Recall the empirical study on temporal autocorrelation. The observed de-
cline of temporal autocorrelation may suggest the increase in the strength of
personalized preference ω.
We ran computer simulations of the stochastic model and collected the
used times of each name in R time steps after reaching the steady state. As
shown in Fig.4, the frequency-rank distribution of baby names follows two-
regime power law, consistent with the empirical result. At present, a vital
issue to be solved is what drives the process of cultural evolution. Luckily,
the empirical study on temporal autocorrelation has given us a key hint that
the strength of personalized preference becomes strong with the evolution.
We checked whether the increase in the strength of personalized preference
generates the evolution by computer simulations with various values of ω.
The results are shown in Fig.5. It can be found that with the increase in
the strength of personalized preference, both the exponents in two regimes
of the frequency-rank distribution decline and the inequality also decreases,
extremely similar to the empirical observations. Thus, we assert that it is
personalization to drive the process of cultural evolution, at least in the
example of baby names.
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Figure 4: The frequency-rank distribution of baby names, resulting from the run of the
computer simulation with N = 6000, B = 250, m = 100, ω = 0.005 and R = 4000. The
distribution follows two-regime power law, where the first and second power law decays
have exponents 0.726± 0.015 and 2.303± 0.003, respectively.
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Figure 5: The evolution of baby names shown by computer simulations. (a) shows the
evolution of the frequency-rank distribution, resulting from the simulations withN = 6000,
B = 250, m = 100, R = 4000 and: ω = 0.005 (black); ω = 0.01 (red); ω = 0.015 (blue);
ω = 0.02 (green). Both the exponents in two regimes of the frequency-rank distribution
decline with increasing ω. (b) shows the change of the inequality with ω. When ω increases,
the inequality decreases.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we take baby names for instance to investigate the pro-
cess of cultural evolution, both empirically and theoretically. In the em-
pirical studies, firstly we find that the frequency-rank distribution of baby
names follows two-regime power law and both the exponents in two regimes
decrease over time. Secondly, we use Simpson’s index to measure the in-
equality among baby names and reveal the decline of inequality. Thirdly, we
define the temporal autocorrelation function and indicate its decaying with
time. To uncover the driving force of cultural evolution, we propose a sim-
ple stochastic model where the individual’s decision making is determined
by personalized preference and social influence. Computer simulations show
that the increase in the strength of personalized preference can produce the
patterns quite similar to the empirical observations. Based on this, we claim
that personalization drives cultural evolution.
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